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Résumé – Cet article présente les premiers résultats d’un travail de recherche visant à la mise en œuvre d’un cadre méthodologique 
d’aide à l’identification des conséquences de l’introduction d’un nouveau système technologique au sein d’un système sociotechnique. 
L’article est structuré en deux parties. La première partie pose les fondements de la recherche à partir de considérations générales sur 
les conséquences d’un changement au sein d’un système complexe. La deuxième partie présente les objectifs et la structure générale du 
cadre méthodologique.   
Abstract – This article is dedicated to the presentation of first results of a research activity related to the definition and the 
development of a framework dedicated to the assessment of consequences of the introduction of a new technological system in a socio-
technological system. The article is structured in two parts. The first one is related to the presentation of the basement of the research 
with some generic consideration about consequences of change in complex systems. The second one is related to the presentation of the 
finality and s-the structure of the framework.   
 
1. Introduction 
The introduction of a new technological system in an 
organisation is the result of a strategic decision aiming to 
support the adaptation of the behaviour of the organisation 
to its environment. New technological system allowing 
increasing one or several performance dimensions such as 
cost effectiveness, flexibility, quality, security or safety.  
The realisation of the technological change is generally 
completed by a risk analysis process aiming to identify 
hazards associated to the new system and by a change 
management process aiming to facilitate the adoption and 
the utilisation of the new system.  
Despite those precautions, several examples can be 
found of occurrence of negative and perverse effects 
affecting negatively the performance of the organisation. 
Those negative effects can be related to the non-
compatibility, to the inefficiency of the new system, to its 
rejection by the operators, to the creation of new 
dependencies or to the loose of flexibility and of margins 
of manoeuvre to perform tasks. 
Those negative effects can have impacts on the financial 
performance of the organisation but can also be at the 
origin of incidents and accidents.  
Technology assessment [1] aims considering the 
potential consequences of new technological system. 
Several methods and tools exist to support such 
assessment. In the context of safety and security, 
traditional risk assessment methods such as FMECA or 
THERP are often used with the purpose to identify 
potential risks related to the adoption of a new technology.  
Such approaches allow considering a set of 
consequences but present some limitations regarding, 
among others things, to consider the complexity of human 
behaviours, of socio-technical systems and of large-scale 
socio-technical systems.   
Objective of this paper is to present theoretical issues 
about anticipating the consequences of a change on the 
safety performance of a system, to present a first prototype 
of change management framework.  
2. Theoretical issues about 
technological assessment 
This section is about the presentation of a set of 
theoretical issues related to technological assessment. 
Three topics are addressed: technological system change 
diversity, consequences diversity and safety dimensions 
diversity.  
2.1 Diversity of technological system 
change 
Technological system diversity can be capture by a two 
typologies [2]. First typology is related to type of functions 
potentially performed by a technological system. Four 
types are considered:  
- Information acquisition. Automation applied to 
the sensing and registration of input data. 
- Information analysis. Automation applied to 
inferential processes for data extrapolation over 
time or prediction. 
  
- Decision and action selection. Automation applied 
to definition of alternatives and selection of the 
suitable one. 
- Action implementation. Automation executing a 
set of actions.  
Second typology is related to the balance between 
automation and operator functions for the realization of a 
task. Ten levels are considered from high-level automation 
to low level: The computer decides everything, acts 
autonomously, ignoring the human (10), inform the human 
only if it, the computer, decides to (9), informs the human 
only if asked, (8) or executes automatically, then 
necessarily informs the human (7), and allow the human a 
restricted time to veto before automatic execution (6), or 
executes that suggestion if the human approves (5), or 
suggests one alternative (4), narrows the selection down to 
a few (3) or the computer offers a complete set of decision 
/ action alternatives (2), or the computer offers no 
assistance: human must take all decisions and actions (1).  
These two typologies capture the diversity of the nature 
of technological system. This supports the definition of the 
nature of the change occurring in an organization. 
Nevertheless, other factors are necessary to describe in 
order to capture the diversity of new technological change:  
- Purpose. Qualitative and quantitative reasons that 
motivates the change (enhancement or reduction of 
performance criteria, technological innovation, 
etc.).  
- Justification. Elements that support the change 
and its impact.  
- Position. Situation change in the light of the 
system: endogenous changes (which occurs within 
the system studied) or exogenous change (which 
occurs outside the system under study).  
- Magnitude. Scope of change within the studied 
system: changing a dimension of the system or 
change the overall structure of the system.  
- Timings. Steps, time, transitions constituting the 
process of change.  
- Direction. Comprehensive strategy in which 
change takes place (link with purpose).  
- Stability. The change may be permanent, transient 
on a given state of the environment.  
- Delay. Delay expected to see the change effect  
Those factors allow considering the variety of 
technological change. Next section is related to the 
diversity of change consequences.  
2.2 Diversity of consequences of change  
Technological systems and humans performances in a 
complex system could lead to different types of 
consequences related to both their initial goals, 
specification for technological system and intention for 
human and interactions and feedback within the 
environment in which they take place [3][4].  
Performance can lead to:  
- Positive unexpected benefit usually referred to as 
serendipity or a windfall. 
- Negative effect, occurring in addition to the desired 
effect of the change.  
- Perverse effect (the unexpected adverse effect is 
greater than the expected beneficial effect)  
- Futility of innovation (the more things change, the 
more they stay the same)  
- Threat of achievements (we want to improve 
society, but only succeeded in removing the 
freedoms and safety). 
Several factors can explain those unexpected 
consequences: 
- Ignorance, it is impossible to anticipate everything, 
thereby leading to incomplete analysis 
- Error, Incorrect analysis of the problem or 
following habits that worked in the past but may 
apply to the current situation 
- Immediate interest, which may override long-term 
interests 
- Basic values may require or prohibit certain actions 
even if the long term result might be unfavourable 
- Self-defeating prophecy, fear of some consequence 
drive people to find solutions before the problem 
occurs, thus the non-occurrence of the problem is 
unanticipated. 
Those concepts support the description of the diversity 
of potential consequences of a change. Next section us 
related to the description of different dimensions to be 
taken in account for considering consequences of change 
on safety performance. 
2.3 Diversity of safety dimensions  
This section is related to the description of different 
safety based dimensions in order to capture the diversity of 
consequences of a technological change of safety 
performance. Four dimensions are considerate: Risk 
dimension, human factors dimension, organisational 
resilience dimension and inter-organisational dimensions.  
Risk is related to the technological system potential 
failures, their probability and the gravity of their 
consequences.  
Human factors are related to human non-technical skills 
that can be affected by the technological system: situation 
awareness, communication, stress, fatigue, decision-
making, etc.[5].   
Organisational resilience is related to the set of 
capacities that contribute to the organisation ability to 
adjust its functioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances, so that it can sustain required operations 
under both expected and unexpected conditions[6].  
Inter-organisational dimension is related to the set of 
systems that interact with the organisation and that can be 
at the origin of unexpected consequences. Such systems 
  
can be legal system, population, clients, suppliers and 
concurrent, entities situated in the same geographical areas, 
etc [7].  
Diversity of technological system change, of 
consequences of change and of safety dimension has to be 
taken in account by a technological assessment process.  
Existing approaches neither focus on managing the 
success of the change without taking in account the safety 
dimension nor are based on traditional risk assessment 
methods such as FMECA, THERP or fault tree analysis. 
Such approaches allow considering a set of consequences 
but present some limitations regarding, among others 
things, to consider the complexity of human behaviours, of 
socio-technical systems and of large-scale socio-technical 
systems.   
Aim of the next section is to describe an integrated 
framework aiming to integrate actual approaches and 
extended them in order to capture al the dimension 
presented.  
2.4 The IMPACT method 
The IMPACT method aims to provide a set of 
recommendations based on the analysis of the risks and 
opportunities of a set of potential consequences identified 
by the mean of the application of an assessment strategy 
related to the technological system change studied.  
The method is structured with two dimensions. The first 
one is related to a methodological guideline describing the 
different steps of the application of the method. The 
second dimension is related to a toolbox containing 
different data acquisition processes guidelines and 
performance indicator assessment guidelines that can be 
used during the application of the IMPACT method. 
2.4.1 IMPACT methodological guideline 
The IMPACT method is structured along four phases.  
- Phase 1 General Outline. The purpose of this 
phase is to describe the knowledge necessary to 
understand the technological change studied and to 
define a strategy dedicated to the identification of 
its potential consequences. The strategy is based on 
the selection of a set of relevant assessment targets. 
- Phase 2 Consequence identification. The purpose 
of this phase is to identify potential consequences 
of the studied change by the applying the 
assessment strategy defined in the first phase. The 
result of this phase will be a list of potential 
consequences.  
- Phase 3 Risks and opportunities analysis. The 
purpose of this phase is to evaluate the risks and 
the opportunities associated with the studied 
change. The set of consequences identified in the 
previous step is looked at and a list of potential 
risks and opportunities are defined.  
- Phase 4 Recommendations for decision-making. 
The purpose of the last phase is to define a set of 
recommendations for the change design and 
management processes based on the analysis of the 
set of risks and opportunities identified in the 
previous step.  
In order to support the application of the method a set of 
methodological guidelines related to on the one hand 
information acquisition processes and on the other hand 
performance dimension assessment is proposed.  
2.4.2 Impact toolbox 
Impact toolbox is constituted of two different 
methodological guidelines: data collection processes and 
performance indicator assessment processes. The 
combination of the two types of processes provides 
assessment modules to be applied during the consequences 
assessment phase of the Impact method.  
In the actual version of the method three types of data 
collection processes are available:  
- Risk assessment. Traditional risk assessment 
processes based on different types of methods 
FMECA, HAZOP, THERP, CREAM, etc. 
- Focus group. Focus Group is an approach that 
consists in asking a group of person their opinion 
about their feelings, opinions, beliefs about an idea, 
a concept, a product, etc. 
- Simulation. Simulation can be an efficient way to 
identify consequences of a change on a system. 
Simple role game or more elaborated simulation 
using technological facilities such as Bridge, Flight 
or Crisis management Simulator can be used in 
order to acquire information about the consequence 
of a change by, for example, comparing the 
execution of a given scenario with and without the 
application if the change.  
Four levels of performance indicators are considerate:   
- Risk based consequences. Consequences related 
to technical, human or organisational failure 
modes.  
- Human and organisational based consequences. 
Consequences covered by human and 
organizational factors approaches: Non-technical 
skills definition and assessment research and 
development activities (situation awareness, 
decision-making, communication, teamwork, 
leadership, stress, fatigue, etc.)[5]; Control 
performance assessment[8] and risk governance 
dimension (pre-assessment, management, 
appraisal, characterization and evaluation and 
communication) [9].  
- High Reliability Organisation and resilience 
engineering based consequences. Consequences 
covered by research done in the context of safety 
science: Organizational resilience capabilities 
(Respond, Learn, Monitor and Anticipate) [6]; 
HRO abilities of management of unexpected 
situations (Preoccupation with failure, Reluctance 
to simplify interpretations, Sensitivity to 
  
operations, Commitment to resilience, Deference 
to expertise)[10] and Efficiency Thoroughness 
Trade of model (Work ETTO, Psychological 
ETTO, and Organizational ETTO) [11].    
2.5 Conclusion 
Objective of IMPACT framework is to integrate safety 
dimensions in change management and technological 
assessment processes.   
First methodological guidelines have been developed 
with a modular approach in trying to integrate different 
sources of data collections processes and performance 
indicators.  
This framework has been experimented with the 
assessment of the potential consequences of the use of 3D 
Chart for navigation functions. A focus group session has 
been organized with representative of maritime systems 
and a set of bridge simulation based on a search and rescue 
mission has been conduct with the use of Stress, Control 
and Situation Awareness assessment modules.  
It’s currently experimented with the assessment of 
potential consequences to the use of UAS and automated 
threat recognition software for pipeline surveillance. A 
focus group session has been organized with representative 
of pipeline surveillance systems and a set of role games 
has been organized in order to identify stakeholders.   
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